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Abstract: In June of 1997, the elected leaders of Vermont enacted the Equal Educational
Opportunity Act (Act 60) in response to a state supreme court decision in Brigham v. State. 
Act 60 could provide a unique opportunity to determine if dramatic school finance reforms
like those enacted in Vermont generate greater equality in measured student performance. 
This paper represents an attempt to document the changes in the distributions of spending and
of student performance that have occurred in the post-Act 60 period.  This paper begins with
an overview of the institutional structure of educational finance and provision in Vermont. 
One purpose of this overview is to make the argument that the Vermont case is particularly
interesting because there have not been dramatic demographics changes that could obscure the
impact of finance reforms.  With this context established, I then use a panel of Vermont
school districts that spans the pre- and post-Act 60 period to examine the extent to which
there has been convergence across school districts in per pupil expenditures and in student
performance.  Spending has clearly converged; a definitive answer on the extent of
convergence in student performance must wait until more years of data are available.
Thanks to Tom Husted, Bill Mathis, Larry Kenny, Jim Wyckoff, John Yinger, Bob Strauss,
and participants in the Economics Department seminar at the University of New Hampshire,
in the Maxwell School's Conference on State Aid to Education, and in the 2001 meetings of
the American Education Finance Association and the Association for Public Policy Analysis
and Management for their helpful comments and suggestions.  All errors of omission and
commission are the responsibility of the author.Lessons from Vermont page 1
1. Introduction
In June of 1997, the elected leaders of Vermont enacted the Equal Educational
Opportunity Act (Act 60) in response to a state supreme court decision in the Brigham v.
State case.  Act 60 may well have represented the most radical reform of a state’s system of
public school financing since the post-Serrano, post-Proposition 13 changes in California in
the late 1970s.  As a result, Act 60 could provide a unique opportunity to determine if
dramatic school finance reforms like those enacted in Vermont generate greater equality in
measured student performance.  This paper represents an attempt to document the changes in
the distributions of spending and of student performance that have occurred in the post-Act 60
period.
This paper begins with an overview of the institutional structure of educational finance
and provision in Vermont.  One purpose of this overview is to make the argument that the
Vermont case is particularly interesting because there have not been dramatic demographic
changes that could obscure the impact of finance reforms.  With this context established, I
review the research on the links between finance reforms and the distributions of education
spending and of student performance.  After briefly discussing the data utilized, I examine the
extent to which there has been convergence across school districts in expenditures and in
student performance.
All of the available data support the conclusion that the link between spending and
taxable resources has been significantly weakened and that spending, however it is measured,
is substantially more equal.  I also present evidence that the cross-district dispersion of
performance of 4  graders on standardized test of mathematics has declined post-Act 60. 
th
And there is no evidence of increased cross-district dispersion of the test performances of 2
nd
and 8  graders.
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2. School Finance Reform in Vermont
In 1995 in Lamoille Superior Court, a group of plaintiffs which included Amanda
Brigham, a nine-year old student in the Whiting School District (Burkett, 1998), filed suit
against the State of Vermont.  The goal of the suit was to force substantive reform of a
system of school financing that the plaintiffs felt deprived students in property-poor school
districts of equal educational opportunities and forced taxpayers in these property-poor
districts to assume a disproportionate burden of the financing of public education.  On
February 5, 1997, the Supreme Court of the State of Vermont ruled in favor of the plaintiffs,
concluding that the existing system deprived “children of an equal educational opportunity in
violation of the Vermont Constitution” (Brigham v. State  (96-502); 166 Vt. 246).  The court
left it to the legislature to craft a new financing system that was consistent with the state
constitution.
The focus in the plaintiffs's suit on both inequalities in educational spending and
disparities in property tax burdens grew out of long-standing dissatisfaction in Vermont with 
the existing foundation system of education financing and the existing system of property
taxation.  Prior to Act 60, Vermont used a traditional foundation formula to determine the
state aid a town received:
(1) Total state aid = (Weighted ADM)*(Foundation amount) - (Foundation tax
rate)*(Aggregate fair market value)*0.01 ,
where the weighted ADM was determined by assigning weights of 1.25 to secondary students
and to students receiving food stamps and weights of between 1.0385 and 1.0714 to students
who must be transported to school and by averaging the weighted counts from the previous
two school years (Mathis, 1995).  While the foundation amount was set with the intent of
permitting districts spending that amount to meet state standards for those students assigned aLessons from Vermont page 3
In the 2000-2001 school year, the nominal property tax rate was 1.1 percent, and the
1
foundation level was $5200.
weight of 1, fluctuations in the state's fiscal status led the state legislature to adjust the
foundation tax rate so as to reduce the state's aid liability.  As a result, the state share of basic
educational expenditures fluctuated between 0.20 and 0.37, with the share declining when the
state economy weakened (Mathis, 2001).  The period leading up to Act 60 was a period of
decline in the state share.
The widespread dissatisfaction with the existing school financing system had not been
ignored by elected officials.  In both 1994 and 1995, the state house of the Vermont
Legislature approved legislation designed to overhaul education financing.  While this
legislation failed to pass the state senate, the legislation contained key elements of the
eventual response to the Brigham decision (McClaughry, 2001).
The legislation, by highlighting concerns about education financing and property
taxation, also influenced the dynamics of the 1996 election.  The state senate that was elected
in 1996 was committed to property tax reform (Mathis, 2001).  The result was a state
legislature that was ready to move on legislation that would comply with the Brigham
decision and reduce the property tax burdens of poor individuals.
Given the political dynamic in Vermont, the speed with which Act 60, the legislation
designed to comply with Brigham and to provide property tax relief, was passed surprised no
one.  Signed into law on June 26, 1997, Act 60 created a system of school financing that
combined elements of foundation and power equalization plans.  A statewide property tax was
established, with revenues from the tax being used to finance a portion of foundation aid.   If
1
in a locality property tax revenues generated by levying the statewide rate exceed the amountLessons from Vermont page 4
In the 1994-95 school year, 69 of the 248 towns in Vermont for which data were
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available had effective education property tax rates below $1.10 per $100 in assessed value.
While the percentage of towns with effective education rates below $1.10 had undoubtedly
declined by the 1997-98 school year, the last year before the phasing in of Act 60 began, the
reality was still that Act 60 forced a sizeable fraction of the towns in Vermont to increase
needed to finance the foundation level of spending, the excess property tax revenues are
recaptured by the state.
Under Act 60, localities are allowed to choose spending levels in excess of the
foundation level.  To weaken the link between property wealth and spending in excess of the
foundation level, the act established a power equalization scheme that insured that localities
with the same nominal tax rates would have the same levels of education spending.  The
power equalization scheme also included a unique recapture element; all spending in excess
of the foundation level is drawn from a sharing pool that consists of all the property tax
revenues generated by property tax rates in excess of the statewide rate.  As a result, no
revenues from statewide taxes are used to finance the power equalizing portion of the school
finance system.  Further, when the voters in a locality choose a nominal property tax rate
above the statewide rate, the revenues that will be available for that locality's schools will not
be known with certainty until all other localities have made their taxing decisions and the size
of the sharing pool is established.
While the Brigham decision forced state policy makers to implement finance reforms,
the reality was that Act 60 was as much about property tax relief as it was about school
finance reform.  For taxpayers in many communities, the finance reforms by themselves
would have dramatically reduced tax burdens by allowing localities to maintain or even
increase education spending with substantially lower tax rates.  At the same time, taxpayers in
high-wealth communities, which have been labeled “gold towns,” necessarily faced increases
in their property tax payments.   To lessen the burden on low-income residents of the “gold
2Lessons from Vermont page 5
property tax rates. 
The correlation between each town's effective education property tax rate in 1994-95
3
and the fraction of that town's property that was owned by town residents in 1998-99 was
0.5461.  In other words, towns with low effective property tax rates prior to Act 60 also
tended to be towns in which a large fraction of the property tax burden was exported.
See Heaps and Woolf (2000) and Jimerson (2001) for efforts to evaluate both the
4
implications of Act 60 for educational provision and the effects of Act 60 on property tax
burdens.
towns,” the drafters of Act 60 included in the legislation a provision that granted tax
adjustments to certain homestead owners.  These tax adjustments were explicitly linked to the
taxpayer's income; the original legislation specified that all owners with incomes at or below
$75,000 were eligible for adjustments.
All of these changes in the property tax were clearly designed to shift some of the
burden of financing Vermont's schools away from state residents to corporations and
nonresident owners of property in Vermont.   Thus, Act 60 continues the recent tradition of
3
linking school finance reforms and tax relief that is exemplified by Michigan.  For this
reason, any complete evaluation of the success of Act 60 must consider both the changes in
education provision and the changes in tax burdens.  Therefore, this paper necessarily
provides a partial view of the welfare implications of Act 60.
4
The school finance reforms that were the central element of Act 60 were phased in
over several years, with the new regime not fully in place until the 2000-2001 academic year. 
Nevertheless, as was true in California in the aftermath of Serrano and Proposition 13, in
some districts there were surprisingly rapid responses to Act 60.  Not surprisingly, in the gold
towns there was vocal opposition to Act 60.  Also unsurprising, given the California
experience, were the efforts in these towns to encourage residents to make voluntaryLessons from Vermont page 6
Since towns that collected sufficient funds from individual contributions could avoid
5
participating in the sharing pool, in most gold towns education funds were established and
property owners were encouraged to contribute to these funds.  Participation rates varied
across towns, ranging up to 87 percent in Manchester, where aggressive tactics, such as
publication of the names of non-participants, were used to encourage giving.  More traditional
incentives were also used to encourage giving; in fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001, the
Freeman Foundation matched individual donations to the funds.
contributions to the schools  and to shift to town governments responsibility for financing
5
certain “school” functions.  Another California parallel is the apparent growth in private
school enrollments that have been mentioned in press reports.
Care needs to be taken, however, to avoid making too much of the California parallels. 
Act 60 gave Vermont school districts much more discretion over the level of expenditures
than California districts have.  The tax price of education spending has increased in the gold
towns, but spending is not being forcibly leveled-down as it was in California.  Also, low
wealth towns were not required to maintain local effort; several towns used the Act 60
windfall primarily to reduce nominal property tax rates.  As a result, low wealth towns were
not necessarily leveled-up.  The reality is that Act 60 did not duplicate the California reforms;
a fact on which the next section expands.
Act 60 did not duplicate the California reforms in one other important way.  The
California reforms pre-dated the nationwide push for accountability; Act 60 was passed at a
time when most states were attempting to strengthen accountability and educational standards. 
As a result, several elements of the legislation built on the existing system of testing and
standards to strengthen accountability.  For example, under Act 60 all districts were required
to develop action plans to improve student performance on the tests that are part Vermont
Comprehensive Assessment System.  In addition, the State Board of Education was mandated
to take on a more active oversight role.  Nevertheless, the central elements of the state's
accountability system were unaffected by Act 60.Lessons from Vermont page 7
For examples of references to California, see McClaughry (1997) and Mathis (1998).
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The number of papers dealing with these varied topics are too numerous too cite. 
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Evans, Murray, and Schwab (1999) and Downes and Figlio (1999, 2000) cite many of the
relevant papers.  
3. Why Study Vermont? - A Review of Research on the Impact School Finance Reforms
The school finance reforms implemented in California in the aftermath of that state's
supreme court decision in the Serrano v. Priest case and of the nearly contemporaneous tax
limits imposed by Proposition 13 represent a watershed both in the debate over the structure
of school finance reforms and in the direction of research into the impact of those reforms. 
In the post-Serrano period the California reforms and their supposed effects on the schools in
that state have been discussed in every state in which school finance reforms have been
implemented.  Vermont is no exception; the supposed parallels between the California
reforms and Act 60 have been mentioned repeatedly.
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The California reforms also shifted the focus of research on the impact of school
finance.  Prior to the reforms, the focus in the literature was almost solely on the impact of
finance reforms on spending inequality.  After Serrano, the scope of the analysis broadened to
include the impact of finance reforms on the level and distribution of student achievement, on
housing prices, on the supply of private schooling, and even on the composition of affected
communities.   The California reforms also became the touchstone for theoretical work. 
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Papers like those of Nechyba (1996, 2000), Bénabou (1996), and Fernandez and Rogerson
(1997, 1998) used a California-like system as the post-reform case when trying to reach
predictions about the likely effects of finance reform.
The problem with using the California case as a benchmark is that the case has proven
to be the exception, not the rule.  First, the limits imposed on local control over spending
have not been duplicated in any other state. Even in Michigan and Vermont, the states inLessons from Vermont page 8
Generating comparable numbers for earlier years is difficult.  Nevertheless, the best
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available data support the conclusion that these sharp differences in trends in the minority
share pre-date the Serrano-inspired reforms.  For example, calculations based on published
information for California indicate the percent minority in 1977-78 was approximately 36.6%. 
Nationally, estimates based on the October 1977 Current Population Survey indicate the
percent minority was 23.9%.
which the most extensive post-Serrano reforms have been implemented, some degree of local
control over taxes and spending is permitted.  Further, the population of students served by
California schools changed more dramatically than the population of students in any other
state in the nation.  From 1986 to 1997, the percent of the California public school student
population identified as minority increased from 46.3% to 61.2%.  Nationally, the percent
minority grew far more slowly, from 29.6% to 36.5%.   As Downes (1992) notes, these
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demographic changes make it difficult to quantify the impact of the finance reforms in
California on the cross-district inequality in student achievement.
The possibility that California might be the exception and not the rule pushed a
number of researchers to pursue national-level studies attempting to document the impact of
finance reforms.  On the spending side, Silva and Sonstelie (1995), Downes and Shah (1995),
and Manwaring and Sheffrin (1997) all took slightly different approaches to quantifying the
effect of finance reforms on mean per pupil spending in a state.  Because they used district-
level data, Hoxby (2001), Evans, Murray, and Schwab (1997), and Murray, Evans, and
Schwab (1998) were able to consider not only the effects of finance reforms on mean
spending but also the extent to which spending inequities were reduced by those reforms.  As
a result, these studies provide the most obvious sources for predictions of the long run effects
of Act 60.  The problem is that these studies generate contradictory predictions.  Hoxby's
results would lead us to expect leveling down, since Act 60 dramatically increases tax pricesLessons from Vermont page 9
in towns with more property wealth.  Murray, Evans, and Schwab conclude that court-
mandated reforms like Act 60 typically result in leveling up.
The same lack of a clear prediction would be apparent to the reader of national-level
attempts to determine how the distribution of student performance in a state is affected by a
finance reform.  Hoxby (2001) represents the first attempt to use national-level data to
examine the effects of finance reforms on student performance.  She finds that dropout rates
increase about eight percent, on average, in states that adopt state-level financing of the public
schools.  Although Hoxby’s work does not explicitly address the effect of equalization on the
within-state distribution of student performance, it seems likely that much of the growth in
dropout rates occurred in those districts with relatively high dropout rates prior to
equalization.  In other words, these results imply that equalization could adversely affect both
the level and the distribution of student performance.
While the dropout rate is an outcome measure of considerable interest, analyses of the
quality of public education in the U.S. tend to focus on standardized test scores and other
measures of student performance that provide some indication of how the general student
population is faring. Husted and Kenny (2000) suggest that equalization may detrimentally
affect student achievement.  Using data on 34 states from 1976-77 to 1992-93, they find that
the mean SAT score is higher for those states with greater intra-state spending variation. 
However, the period for which they have test score information, 1987-88 to 1992-93, post-
dates the imposition of the first wave of finance reforms.  Thus, the data do not permit direct
examination of the effects of policy changes.  In addition, because they use state-level data,
Husted and Kenny cannot examine the degree to which equalization affects cross-districtLessons from Vermont page 10
Husted and Kenny do find evidence consistent with the conclusion that, in state's in
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which school finance reforms, these reforms have no impact on the standard deviation of SAT
scores.  Since, however, the standard deviation of test scores could be unchanged even if
cross-district inequality in performance had declined, this evidence fails to establish that
finance reforms do not reduce cross-district performance inequality.
For instance, among the students in Card and Payne’s low-parental-education group,
10
in 28 states in 1978 (25 states in 1990) fewer than ten percent took the SAT examination and
in 20 states in 1978 (15 states in 1990) fewer than three percent took the SAT.  Further, in
1978 no state had more than 36.2 percent of the low-parental-education group take the SAT.
variation in test scores.   Finally, since only a select group of students take the SAT, Husted
9
and Kenny are not able to consider how equalization affects the performance of all students in
a state.
Card and Payne (2002) explore the effects of school finance equalizations on the
within-state distributions of SAT scores.  They characterize a school finance policy as more
equalizing the more negative is the within-state relationship between state aid to a school
district and school district income.  They find that the SAT scores of students with
poorly-educated parents (their proxy for low income) increase in states that, under their
definition, become more equalized.  Data limitations, however, make it impossible for Card
and Payne to examine the effects of policy changes on students residing in school districts in
which the changes had the greatest impact.  Moreover, while Card and Payne correct for
differences in the fractions of the population taking the SAT test, it is still very likely that the
students who come from low-education backgrounds but take the SAT test are a very select
group and are extremely unlikely to be representative of the low-income or low-education
population as a whole.
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Downes and Figlio (2000) attempt to determine how the tax limits and finance reforms
of the late 1970s and early 1980s affected the distribution of student performance in states in
which limits were imposed and how student performance has changed in these states relativeLessons from Vermont page 11
to student performance in states in which no limits or no finance reforms were imposed.  The
core data used in the analysis were drawn from two national data sets, the National
Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS-72) and the 1992 (senior year)
wave of the NELS.  The NELS data were collected sufficiently far from the passage of most
finance reforms to permit quantification of the long-run effects of these reforms by analyzing
changes in the distributions of student performance between the NLS-72 cross-section and the
NELS cross-section.
Downes and Figlio find that finance reforms in response to court-decisions, like that in
the Brigham case,  result in small and frequently insignificant increases in the mean level of
student performance on standardized tests of reading and mathematics.  Further, they note that
there is some indication that the post-reform distribution of scores in mathematics may be less
equal.  This latter result highlights one of the central points of the paper; any evaluation of
finance reforms must control for the initial circumstances of affected districts.  The simple
reality is that finance reforms are likely to have differential effects in initially high spending
and initially low spending districts.
The fundamental reason for the absence of clear predictions of the impact of finance
reforms has been mentioned by a number of authors (e.g., Downes and Shah (1995), Hoxby
(2001), Evans, Murray, and Schwab (1997)), all of whom have emphasized the tremendous
diversity of school finance reforms.  In a national-level study, any attempt to classify finance
reforms will be imperfect.  So, even though there is general consensus that the key elements
of a finance reform are the effects of the reform on local discretion, the effects of the reform
on local incentives, and the change in state-level responsibilities in the aftermath of reform
(Hoxby (2001), Courant and Loeb (1997)), different authors take different approaches to
account for the heterogeneity of the reforms.  The result is variation in predictions generatedLessons from Vermont page 12
by studies that are asking the same fundamental question.  The answer, it seems, is not to try
and improve the methods of classifying reforms but is, instead, to carefully analyze certain
canonical reforms.  Act 60 is likely to be just such a canonical reform.
In looking for guidance for an analysis of the Vermont reforms, the first case to
consider is that of Kentucky, where the reforms that followed a court decision invalidating the
system of school finance may represent the most radical change to a state's system of public
schooling provision.  Flanagan and Murray (2002) document the effects of the reforms in
Kentucky.  Unfortunately, because the reforms in Kentucky were so extensive, any lessons
from that case are probably not particularly relevant for those attempting to predict the effect
of reforms that, like Act 60, primarily affect the system of school finance. 
Thus, the most direct antecedent in this case-study approach to analyzing finance
reforms is Downes (1992), who showed that the extensive school finance reforms in
California in the late 1970s generated greater equality across school districts in per pupil




































































































































































































































































  Will the outcomes in Vermont
duplicate those in California?  What are the similarities in and differences between the results
for Vermont, Kansas, and Kentucky?  The data used to answer these questions are described
in the next section.
4. Data
4.1 Sources
The majority of the data that are analyzed in this paper are drawn from the Vermont
School Report and from publications of the Vermont Department of Taxes.  In addition, town
level data on school expenditures were drawn from Heaps and Woolf (2000) and from filesLessons from Vermont page 13
In the 2001-2002 school year, 824 equalized pupils (out of 103,347 equalized pupils
11
in the state) resided in towns or other areas in which all students were tuitioned out.  Another
87 equalized pupils resided in towns that did not operate an elementary school but belonged
to a union high school district.
In the 2001-2002 school year, 15,274 equalized pupils resided in towns in which
12
elementary students were served locally but high school students were tuitioned out.  Of these
15,274 equalized pupils less than half were tuitioned out.
created by the Vermont Department of Education and posted at
http://www.state.vt.us/educ/schfin/class/dist_class.html.  The Vermont Indicators Online
database, that is maintained by the Center for Rural Studies at the University of Vermont, was
the source some pre-1999 information on income, demographics, and property wealth at the
town level.  Finally, the Common Core of Data that is maintained by the National Center for
Education Statistics was the source of school-level data on the racial/ethnic composition of
the each school's student body.
The norm in Vermont is that towns and school districts are coterminous.  There are,
however, numerous deviations from the norm.  Some small towns do not operate elementary
or secondary schools; the children from these towns are sent to public or even private schools
in neighboring communities, with tuition payments going from the sending towns to the
receiving schools.   Many other towns do not have their own high schools, choosing to either
11
“tuition-out” their high school children or to participate in unit high school districts.   Since
12
one of the goals of this research was to quantify the impact of Act 60 on the inequality in
services provided to the school children of Vermont, the school district had to be the
fundamental unit of analysis.  Thus, several decisions had to be made to ensure that what was
presented was the most accurate picture of the impact of Act 60 on the distributions of
expenditures and student performance.  First, all towns that were not tuitioning-out students at
the elementary level were matched to the school district serving elementary school studentsLessons from Vermont page 14
If a town tuitions out either elementary or high school students, those students could
13
be attending school in several surrounding districts.  As a result, the town cannot be matched
to a single elementary or high school district. 
from that town.  The same matching process was done for towns not tuitioning out high
school students.   Knowing the town-school district matches made it possible to create school
13
district level versions of some variables that were only available at the town level.  Second,
towns were grouped into types based on institutional arrangements.  This made it possible to
examine separately the impact of Act 60 on school districts linked to towns with different
institutional arrangements.
Nevertheless, the reality in Vermont is that school spending levels are voted on in
town meeting, that state aid flows to towns and not school districts, and that analyses of the
impact of Act 60 have tended to focus on variation across towns in expenditures.  So, even
though cross-town variation provides an imperfect indication of the variation across school
districts (and, thus, across students) in expenditures, results are presented that use town-level
data on expenditures.  These results make it possible to compare the findings in this study to
those in previous work.  Further, the town-level data are such that it is possible to make a
crude adjustment for the effect of institutional variation on expenditures.  In particular, the
analysis in this paper will use two alternative measures of expenditures, one of which is
explicitly designed to adjust for variation in institutional structure.
4.2 Summary statistics
One of the advantages of examining the impact of finance reforms in Vermont is the
stability of the student population served by Vermont schools.  For example, in the 1995-96
school year 3.12% of the students attending public school in Vermont were identified as
minority.  This percentage fluctuated slightly over the next four academic years, from 2.73%Lessons from Vermont page 15
Means across schools of the percent minority evidence the same stability.  In 1995-
14
96, the across-school mean was 2.1%.  In 1999-2000, the across-school mean was 2.8%.
in 1996-97 to 3.16% in 1999-2000.   Clearly, in Vermont, unlike in California, the schools
14
were not trying to adjust to a dramatically changing population at the same time they were
coping with the effects of finance reforms.
Other measures of the income and demographics of the Vermont student population
were also relatively stable both immediately before and just after the implementation of Act
60.  For each school year from 1994-95 to 2000-2001, Table 1 provides summary statistics on
certain key measures of the demographics and income of each school district in the state. 
Average adjusted gross income per exemption, a rough proxy for per capita income, did
increase throughout the period, an unsurprising result given that all dollar figures in the table
are nominal and that this was a period of strong economic expansion.  What is more striking,
however, is the stability across time of the poverty rate and the percent of students eligible
for free or reduced-price school lunches.  The observable characteristics of the population of
students being served by Vermont schools appear to have changed little over time.
This stability of measured attributes of the student population does not insure that
there have been no significant changes in critical unmeasured characteristics of the students
served by the public schools in Vermont.  In other words, in an event analysis of the impact
of Act 60 on the distribution of student performance, there will be no way to rule out the
possibility that cross-time changes in the distribution are driven by cross-time changes in
unobservables as opposed to by the effects of the finance reforms.  That said, the Vermont
context still provides researchers with the best opportunity to date to estimate the effects of
finance reforms on the distribution of student performance.Lessons from Vermont page 16
The remaining rows in Table 1 provide summary information on some of the
expenditure and student performance measures available in the Vermont School Report.  No
obvious trends in performance are apparent in Table 1.  Some performance measures
improved after Act 60; others declined.  For some of the measures of performance, dispersion
fell after Act 60, but dispersion increased for other measures.  However, because the crude
summary measures in Table 1 give no indication of how post-Act 60 changes are linked to a
district's pre-Act 60 status, no conclusions about the performance effects of Act 60 can be
drawn on the basis of the evidence in Table 1.
Table 1 also does not support any firm conclusions about the extent to which the link
between local wealth and spending has been weakened by Act 60.  That said, even the
summary measures in Table 1 provide some indication of the impact of Act 60 on the
dispersion in expenditures.  The coefficient of variation of current expenditures per pupil
increased from 3.61 in 1994-95 to 5.71 in 1999-2000.  While some of this increase pre-dated
Act 60, Act 60 has mattered, a fact that should be more evident when post-phase in
expenditure measures are analyzed.  It is to these measures that we turn in the next section.
5. Results
5.1 The Distribution of Expenditures Before and After Act 60
The starting point of any evaluation of the effects of Act 60 is the choice of a measure
of per pupil expenditures.  When towns have been used as the unit of analysis, two measures
of spending have been used in analyses of the extent of spending inequality and the effect of
Act 60 on that inequality.  Heaps and Woolf (2000) used budgeted expenditures per equalized
pupil.  However, because many towns send or receive students for whom tuition is being
paid, inequality in budgeted expenditures may overstate true spending inequality.  For
example, overstatement of inequality could result because budgeted expenditures per equalizedLessons from Vermont page 17
Since categorical aid is fungible, increases in categorical aid do increase the
15
opportunities even for those students toward whom the aid is not targeted.
pupil are based on residential pupil counts that do not include tuitioning students, resulting in
artificially high per pupil numbers for districts receiving tuition students.  So, as an
alternative, other analysts, like Jimerson (2001) and Baker (2001), use measures of spending
based on the state's calculation of local education spending per equalized pupil.  Local
education spending is that portion of a school district budget paid by the general state support
grant, local education tax revenues, and any aid from the sharing pool when applicable. Local
education spending does not include federal aid or privately donated dollars.
In what follows, both measures of spending are considered since neither is a perfect
indicator of the educational opportunities available to students in a town.  The argument for
using budgeted expenditures is that this measure includes expenditures out of not only
noncategorical state aid and property tax income but also expenditures out of such diverse
income sources as categorical aid for special education  and income from the private
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donations to the schools.  But, because of the problems created by students for whom tuition
payments are being made, local education spending per pupil must also be considered.
At the school district level, the choice of expenditure measures is some what more
clear cut.  Current expenditures per pupil measures non-capital spending; total expenditures
per pupil includes current and capital spending.  In the analysis that follows, both of these
measures are examined.  It is not possible, however, to examine the extent to which cost-
adjusted spending has become more equal.  Both before and after Act 60, the state aid
formula recognized the fact that certain students are more costly to educate, basing aid
amounts not on raw pupil counts but on equalized pupil counts.  The equalized pupil count
was determined by assigning weights of 1.25 to secondary students and to students receivingLessons from Vermont page 18
food stamps and weights of 1.2 to students with limited English proficiency and by averaging
the weighted counts across two school years (Mathis, 2001).  Since these weights are ad hoc
and other critical determinants of cost are not taken into account, the cost adjustments in the
basic state aid formula will be imperfect (Downes and Pogue, 1994).  Categorical aid
programs, like a small schools grant program that was established by Act 60, may help to
reduce inequality in cost-adjusted aid.  Nevertheless, any inequality measures presented below
undoubtedly understate the extent of inequality in cost-adjusted spending, since high-cost
districts are typically low-spending districts.
While the circumstances cited by the plaintiffs in Brigham v. State existed for many
years, trends in spending inequality in the late 1980s and early 1990s undoubtedly contributed
to the decision to file suit.  For example, from 1989-90 to 1994-95, current expenditures per
pupil had grown at an annual rate of 3.77% at the top of the range.  The annual growth rate
at the bottom of the range was only 1.9%.  The Brigham decision was handed down when the
dispersion in expenditures was large and growing.
Standard inequality measures like the coefficient of variation and the Gini coefficient
can both reflect the tail end of these trends and can provide an initial indication of the impact
of Act 60 on spending inequality.  And, when the town level measures of spending are used,
the initial indication is that spending has become more equal post-Act 60.  In particular, for
budgeted expenditures in 1998-99, the coefficient of variation was 0.1508 and the Gini
coefficient was 0.0851.  In 2000-2001, the coefficient of variation was 0.1305 and the Gini
coefficient was 0.0731.  These measures of inequality increased slightly from 2000-2001 to
2001-2002, to 0.1360 for the coefficient of variation and 0.0758 for the Gini coefficient, but
both measures were still below there 1998-99 levels.  And, since Act 60 was already beingLessons from Vermont page 19
The pattern of Gini coefficients for current expenditures per pupil in these districts is
16
very similar.  The values of the Gini coefficients were 0.0801 in 1995-96, 0.0776 in 1996-97,
0.0835 in 1997-98, 0.0796 in 1998-99, 0.0776 in 1999-2000, and 0.0690 in 2000-2001.
In addition to K-12 districts and elementary districts located in towns that belong to
17
union or joint high school districts, the other large group of districts is elementary districts
located in towns that tuition-out their high school students.
Again, the pattern of Gini coefficients for current expenditures per pupil in these
18
districts is very similar.  The values of the Gini coefficients were 0.1177 in 1995-96, 0.0955
in 1996-97, 0.1015 in 1997-98, 0.1044 in 1998-99, 0.1013 in 1999-2000, and 0.1107 in 2000-
2001.
phased-in in 1998-99, these numbers probably understate the extent to which inequality in
education spending by towns has declined after the implementation of Act 60.
Inequality measures at the school district level tell much the same story as town level
inequality measures.  For example, for those school districts serving students in grades K-12,
the coefficient of variation of current expenditures per pupil was 0.1482 in 1995-96.  For
these districts, the coefficient of variation fell to 0.1412 in 1996-97 but increased to 0.1488 in
1997-98, the last pre-Act 60 year.  In the post-Act 60 period, the coefficient of variation for
current expenditures per pupil in these school districts has consistently declined, falling to
0.1425 in 1998-99, to 0.1386 in 1999-2000, and to 0.1251 in 2000-2001.
16
For other types of school districts, the inequality measures tend to tell the same story-
fluctuating inequality pre-Act 60 and declining inequality post-Act 60.  The one exception
occurs for those elementary school districts located in towns that belong to union or joint high
school districts.   For these districts, the coefficients of variation in current expenditures per
17
pupil were 0.2760 in 1995-96, 0.1706 in 1996-97, 0.1837 in 1997-98, 0.1929 in 1998-99,
0.1889 in 1999-2000, and 0.2119 in 2000-2001.   Whether this increase in inequality in
18
spending in 2000-2001 was an anomaly or a reflection of an increased ability of districts to
circumvent Act 60 can only be determined as more years of data become available.Lessons from Vermont page 20
Even if this increase in inequality in elementary school districts located in towns that
belong to union or joint high school districts is not an anomaly, dispersion of expenditures
does not imply unequal opportunities attributable to differences in taxable wealth, a reality
that was recognized by the Vermont Supreme Court.  For instance, dispersion in current
expenditures per pupil could exist and be unrelated to property wealth if the state targeted
categorical aid to districts with a greater proportion of disadvantaged students.  What
equalization of educational opportunities does require is elimination of the positive correlation
between expenditures and taxable wealth.  That this is the case is made clear in the Brigham
decision
Equal educational opportunity cannot be achieved when property-rich school
districts may tax low and property-poor districts must tax high to achieve even
minimum standards.  Children who live in property-poor districts and children
who live in property-rich districts should be afforded a substantially equal
opportunity to have access to similar educational revenues. (page 23, Brigham
v. State  (96-502); 166 Vt. 246)
Simple inequality measures do not tell us the extent to which Act 60 has produced a
system of school financing in which the correlation between spending and wealth has been
reduced.  Thus, following the logic of Downes (1992), simple ordinary least squares
regressions of the spending measures on measures of local resources were used to determine
the extent to which Act 60 has reduced this correlation.  For towns, the results of these
regressions are presented in Tables 3A and 3B.
For the 246 towns in Vermont for which the relevant data are available, the first part
of Table 3A indicates the correlation between budgeted expenditures per equalized pupil andLessons from Vermont page 21
Because of data limitations, equalized assessed valuation can only be calculated for
19
1998-99.  The 1998-99 values are used throughout this analysis.  While pre-Act 60 measures
of property wealth would probably be preferable, Act 60-induced changes in property values
were unlikely to be apparent in 1998-99, the first year of the phase-in of Act 60.
It is not possible to separate capital expenditures out of this measure of per pupil
20
expenditures.  No clear indication exists as to whether the correlation of this expenditure
measure with assessed valuation overstates or understates the correlation of current
expenditures with assessed valuation.  Thus, some caution must be exercised in interpreting
these correlations.
equalized assessed valuation per pupil  was .516,  clear evidence districts with more real
19    20
property wealth did have higher per pupil expenditures prior to Act 60.  Since Act 60 was
already being phased-in in 1998-99, this correlation probably understates the actual strength
of the relationship between expenditures and property wealth prior to the Brigham decision.
The remainder of the first column of Table 3A show that, while the extent of
inequality in educational opportunities varies across potential measures of taxable resources,
the conclusion that opportunities were unequal does not depend on the measure of taxable
resources used.  For example, if permanent income is taken as the measure of taxable
resources and median family income is used to proxy for permanent income, the correlation
between budgeted expenditures per equalized pupil and taxable resources is .295, much less
than the correlation between budgeted expenditures and equalized assessed valuation but still
strong.
As the discussion of Table 1 indicated, after Act 60 dispersion in expenditures was
reduced, even in the phase-in years.  Nevertheless, dispersion remained.  But the Brigham
decision did not require equalization of expenditures; the decision required the ability to fund
public education be independent of (or negatively correlated with) taxable wealth.  The
second column of Table 3A and both columns of Table 3B provide the evidence needed to
determine if Act 60 has resulted in an education financing system that satisfies the BrighamLessons from Vermont page 22
Given the available data, it was not possible to quantify directly the strength of the
21
correlation between expenditures and wealth measures prior to implementation of Act 60. 
However, the results of Baker (2001) provide an indirect indication of the strength of the
correlation.  In regressions that are analogous to those in part 3 of Table 3B, Baker generates
R s ranging from 0.47 to 0.51 for the school years from 1994-95 to 1998-99.  Further, the
2
highest R  occurs in 1998-99, the first year of the Act 60 phase-in.  The implication, then, is
2
that the correlation between expenditures and the wealth measures considered in this paper
was probably strong and stable in the years leading up to Act 60.
decision.  From 1998-99 to 2001-2002, the correlation between equalized assessed valuation
per pupil and budgeted expenditures per equalized pupil fell from .516 to .104 and, in the
latter year, was barely significant at the 10 percent level.  Similar weakening in the
relationship between this expenditure measure and other measures of taxable resources can be
seen in Table 3A.  Further, in Table 3B, which gives only post-Act 60 correlations between
taxable resource measures and local expenditures per equalized pupil, the estimated
relationship between equalized assessed valuation per pupil and local expenditures per
equalized pupil is actually negative.  Median family income continues to be positively related
to local expenditures per equalized pupil, though this relationship does appear to be
weakening over time.
In combination with the evidence on the simple distributions of expenditures, these
results support the view that a good faith effort has been made to satisfy the Brigham
decision.  While the correlation between the two expenditure measures considered here and
taxable resources has not been reduced to zero, educational opportunities were more equal in
2001-2002 than in 1998-99.
21
When we turn to school districts as the unit of analysis, the results do not provide
quite as unequivocal picture of the impact of Act 60 on the correlation between wealth
measures and per pupil spending.  In Tables 4A and 4B, the results of regressions like those
that generated the results in Tables 3A and 3B are reported for the case when K-12 districtsLessons from Vermont page 23
All of these regressions have been estimated in log-log form and with
22
contemporaneous measures of per pupil equalized assessed value and adjusted gross income
per exemption replacing the lagged measures used in Tables 4A, 4B, 5A, and 5B.  The
implications of the results that are generated from these alternative specifications are the same
as those reported here.
are the unit of analysis.  In Tables 5A and 5B, elementary school districts located in towns
that belong to union or joint high school districts are the unit of analysis.
22
When current expenditures per pupil is used as the spending measure, the correlations
between spending and wealth decline for each wealth measure and both for K-12 districts and
for elementary school districts located in towns that belong to union or joint high school
districts.  If, however, total expenditures per pupil is used as the spending measure, there is
not consistent evidence of a weakening in the relationship between spending and wealth. 
Only when K-12 districts are the unit of analysis and equalized assessed value per pupil is the
wealth measure has the correlation declined, from 0.184 in 1997-98 to 0.176 in 1998-99.  For
the other wealth measures, the correlation between total expenditures per pupil and wealth has
increased for the K-12 districts.  And for each of the three wealth measures, the correlation
between total expenditures per pupil and wealth has increased for elementary school districts
located in towns that belong to union or joint high school districts.  Explaining this
strengthening of the correlation between total expenditures per pupil and wealth will be a task
for future work.  But, what is apparent now is that this correlation will be made stronger by
recent legislation that excludes from the sharing pool property tax revenues that are raised to
fund capital improvements.
5.2 Student Performance Before and After Act 60
As the discussion in Section 2 indicates, the Brigham decision focused on spending
inequities.  Further, the goals of Act 60 were to reduce spending inequities and to provide
property tax relief.  Nevertheless, the justices of the Vermont Supreme Court made clear inLessons from Vermont page 24
Jimerson (2001) observes a similar decline in the correlation between equalized
23
assessed value per pupil and the percent of 4  graders at or above the standard for the NSRE.
th
Results for the performance of 2  and 8  graders tend to mirror those in Tables 4
24           nd    th
and 5.  In no instance is there evidence that student performance has become less equal post-
Act 60.
their decision that in their view inequities in expenditures were likely to translate into
inequities in outcome:
While we recognize that equal dollar resources do not necessarily translate
equally in effect, there is no reasonable doubt that substantial funding
differences significantly affect opportunities to learn.  To be sure, some school
districts may manage their money better than others, and circumstances
extraneous to the educational system may substantially affect a child’s
performance.  Money is clearly not the only variable affecting educational
opportunity, but it is one that government can effectively equalize. (page 9,
Brigham v. State  (96-502); 166 Vt. 246)
Thus, consideration must be given to how the distribution across districts of student
performance changed after Act 60.
A crude indication of the impact of Act 60 on student performance is given by Table
2, which presents correlations in 1995-96 and 1999-2000 between some of the district
characteristics summarized in Table 1.  The correlations between student performance and all
available measures of the resources allocated towards education have weakened in the post-
Act 60 period.  The starkest example of the weakening of these relationships is the decline
from 1994-95 to 2000-2001 of the relationship between current expenditures per pupil and the
percent of 4  graders at or above the standard for the concepts portion of the New Standards
th
Reference Exam (NSRE) in Mathematics.   A more systematic assessment of the impact of
23
Act 60 can be based on the results in Table 6, which give a few typical event-analysis
regressions that are similar in flavor to those in Downes and Figlio (2000).
24
Because they include controls for district-specific effects and because they are based
on a functional form that explicitly accounts for the reality that the share of students meetingLessons from Vermont page 25
the standard must range between 0 and 1, regressions like those in Table 6 provide the most
convincing estimates of the impact of Act 60.  Further, because in these regressions the
impact of Act 60 is allowed to vary with pre-Act 60 spending levels or pre-Act 60 property
wealth, the regressions provide a direct indication of the extent to which the link between
wealth and performance has changed post-Act 60.  And, what is apparent from these
regressions, and from a number of regressions in which other outcome measures are used as
the dependent variable, is that there is some evidence that the gaps in performance between
high spending and low spending districts and between high wealth and low wealth districts
have, ceteris paribus, declined post-Act 60.  In these regressions, the coefficient on the
interaction between the Act 60 dummy and the pre-Act 60 spending or pre-Act 60 wealth is
never positive and significant.  And, as can be seen in Table 6, these coefficients are
frequently negative and significant.
Care must be taken, however, not to make too much of the declines in inequality.  The
coefficients on the interactions are not consistently negative and significant.  Further, when
these coefficients are significant, they are quantitatively small.  For example, the coefficient
in the first column of Table 4 implies that, ceteris paribus, the difference between the shares
of 4  graders at or above the standard for a school district with spending one standard
th
deviation below the mean in 1994-95 and a school district with spending one standard
deviation above the mean in 1994-95 would decline by 0.0021 if each district had the mean
number of test-takers in 2000-2001.  It seems unlikely that such small declines in dispersion
in performance justify a major policy intervention like Act 60.
6. Concluding Remarks
Act 60 represents a dramatic change in the system of education financing in a state
with a history of a demographically stable student population.  As a result, Act 60 may wellLessons from Vermont page 26
provide an unparalleled opportunity to assess the impact of a significant finance reform on a
state's education system.  This paper represents a first cut at just such an assessment.
All of the evidence cited in this paper supports the conclusion that Act 60 has
dramatically reduced dispersion in education spending and has done this by weakening the
link between spending and property wealth.  Further, the regressions presented in this paper
offer some evidence that student performance has become more equal in the post-Act 60
period.  And no results support the conclusion that Act 60 has contributed to increased
dispersion in performance.
By themselves, these results may provide useful information for policy makers
contemplating Act 60-style reforms.  But the value of these results may well increase
dramatically when taken together with the results of Duncombe and Johnston (2002) and of
Flanagan and Murray (2002).  What is striking is the similarity across studies in the estimated
achievement effects.  Pre-finance reform data on student test scores are not available to
Duncombe and Johnston; they find no evidence of a diminishment in the dispersion in
performance is apparent when examining post-finance reform test scores.  They also
document some recent relative improvement in dropout rates in high poverty districts, though
they also find increased dispersion in dropout rates when comparing pre- and post-finance
reform data.
The bottom line of Duncombe and Johnston's analysis of dropout rates is that reform
has resulted in small relative improvements.  Flanagan and Murray reach conclusions similar
to those reached in this paper − post-reform dispersion in schooling outcomes has declined,
but this decline in dispersion has been small.  The results presented above indicate that, in
Vermont, there have been, at most, small relative improvements in the test performance of
fourth and eighth graders in those school districts with lower pre-reform per pupil spendingLessons from Vermont page 27
and per pupil property wealth.  Flanagan and Murray find that relative increases in
post-reform spending were translated into relative gains in post-reform test performance, but
these gains were quantitatively small.  Somewhat surprisingly, then, the results of these new
case studies tend to echo the results of the earlier work on California.  Thus far, the case
studies have confirmed a conclusion that was reached by many of the researchers who
executed national-level analyses; the types of finance reforms that have been implemented in
response to court orders appear to have little, if any, impact on the distribution of student test
performance.Lessons from Vermont page 28
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Table 1
Summary Statistics - Selected Characteristics of Vermont School Districts
Variable Stan- Stan- Stan- Stan- Stan- Stan- Stan-
Pre-Act 60 Post- Act 60
1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-2001
Mean dard Mean dard Mean dard Mean dard Mean dard Mean dard Mean dard
Dev. Dev. Dev. Dev. Dev. Dev. Dev.
Current Exp. 5582.78 1546.03 5776.07 1502.84 5935.14 1012.70 6175.11 1105.13 6652.33 1294.00 7601.18 1330.29 8262.36 1491.91
Per Pupil
Spec. Ed. 1202.85 628.48 1294.49 710.64 1363.33 654.22 1503.53 710.10 1693.59 839.70 — --- — ---
Costs Per
Elig. Pupil
Students Per 17.96 11.34 17.53 3.87 17.28 3.28 16.86 3.04 16.57 3.56 15.70 2.97 15.09 2.91
Classroom
Teacher
Ave. Teacher 32472.06 4249.53 33527.29 4520.34 33948.62 4495.41 --- --- 34898.05 4889.94 35487.94 4857.72 36167.98 4821.56
Salary
Students Per --- --- --- --- 14.16 11.86 8.04 4.65 7.35 4.84 6.76 4.44 --- ---
Computer
Pct. Elig. for --- --- --- --- 27.66 17.90 29.20 17.99 29.42 18.12 28.82 17.41 28.04 16.87
Free/Red.-
Price Lunch
Poverty Rate 12.16 7.64 11.90 7.91 10.91 8.04 11.59 7.40 10.74 7.50 11.85 7.70 10.68 7.04




Pct. at/Above --- --- --- --- --- --- 75.70 13.62 71.89 15.34 75.63 14.60 78.01 14.22
Stand. - Gr. 2
Reading
Pct. at/Above --- --- 17.41 14.62 --- --- 32.47 19.10 37.94 17.88 38.14 18.84 42.05 18.99
Stand. - Gr. 4
Math Conc.
Pct. at/Above --- --- --- --- 58.17 17.89 79.19 13.22 86.12 11.00 83.04 12.70 79.30 13.23
Stand. - Gr. 4
Read.
Pct. at/Above --- --- 30.32 14.44 --- --- 37.98 18.16 31.75 16.56 32.08 15.65 35.76 18.65
Stand. - Gr. 8
Math Conc.
Pct. at/Above --- --- --- --- 73.03 13.15 61.38 16.70 63.02 13.82 58.62 15.27 63.27 14.21
Stand. - Gr. 8
Read.  
Note: 1) In 1997-98 and 1998-99, average adjusted gross income per exemption is available for all school districts (n=248).  In the remaining years, average
adjusted gross income per exemption is only available for those districts that correspond directly to towns (n=203).Lessons from Vermont page 32
Table 2
Correlations Between Selected Characteristics for Vermont School Districts, 1995-96
Variable Per Pupil Classroom Salary (from tax  Degree (1990) Stand. - Gr. - Gr. 8 Math
Current Students Ave. Poverty Avg. AGI per  Pct. of Adults Pct. at or Pct. at or
Expend. Per Teacher Rate exemption with College Above Above Stand.






Classroom -0.2011     1.0000
Teacher
Ave. Teacher
Salary 0.2730 0.0023 1.0000
Poverty Rate -0.0945 -0.0373 -0.1780 1.0000




0.2313 0.1337 0.5196 -0.5571 1.0000
Pct. of Adults











0.2058 0.0312 0.2371 -0.3380 0.3099 0.3741 0.1929 1.0000Lessons from Vermont page 33
Table 2 (cont.)
Correlations Between Selected Characteristics for Vermont School Districts, 2000-2001
Variable Pupil Teacher Salary (from tax  Degree - Gr. 4 Math - Gr. 8 Math
Current Students Per Ave. Poverty Avg. AGI per  Pct. of Adults Pct. at or Pct. at or
Expend. Per Classroom Teacher Rate exemption with College Above Stand. Above Stand.







Salary 0.1822 0.3108 1.0000
Poverty Rate -0.0933 -0.1774 -0.2763 1.0000
Avg. AGI per 
exemption (from 0.1781 0.3482 0.5772 -0.6019 1.0000
tax  returns)
Pct. of Adults
with College 0.2464 0.2293 0.4617 -0.5707 0.8270 1.0000
Degree (1990)
Pct. at or Above
Stand. - Gr. 4  0.0640 0.0792 0.1303 -0.3028 0.3278 0.3107 1.0000
Math Concepts
Pct. at or Above
Stand. - Gr. 8 0.2914 0.1394 0.1814 -0.3064 0.2986 0.3071 0.3257 1.0000
Math ConceptsLessons from Vermont page 34
Table 3A
Relationships Between Expenditures and Wealth Measures for Vermont Towns
Dependent Variable: Budgeted Expenditures Per Equalized Pupil
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Part 1
Variable   1998-99  2001-2002
Intercept   7099.495  9053.913
Equalized Assessed Valuation   0.00093   0.00021
per pupil  (0.00027)  (0.00012)
R   0.266   0.019
2
Correlation   0.516   0.138
coefficient
  (125.227)   (96.342)
Part 2
Variable   1998-99  2001-2002
Intercept   5932.714  8204.978
Median Family Income in 1989   0.04901   0.02973
R   0.0873   0.0265
2
Correlation   0.295   0.163
coefficient
  (357.866)  (403.246)
 (0.01110)  (0.01160)
Part 3
Variable  1998-99  2001-2002
Intercept   5781.257   8162.943
Equalized Assessed Valuation   0.00088   0.00021
per pupil  (0.00024)  (0.00012)
Median Family Income   0.04102    0.02756
R   0.326    0.0447 
2
Correlation   0.571   0.211
Coefficient
  (298.144)   (395.430)
 (0.00910)  (0.01160)Lessons from Vermont page 35
Table 3B
Relationships Between Expenditures and Wealth Measures for Vermont Towns
Dependent Variable: Local Expenditures Per Equalized Pupil
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Part 1
Variable  2000-2001  2001-2002
Intercept  6980.417  7520.317
Equalized Assessed Valuation  -0.00036  -0.00029
per pupil  (0.00011)  (0.00009)
R   0.0613   0.0459
2
Correlation   0.248   0.214
Coefficient
  (75.355)   (80.534)
Part 2
Variable  2000-2001  2001-2002
Intercept   5419.094   6328.920
Median Family Income   0.04200   0.03087
R   0.0862   0.0362
2
Correlation   0.294   0.190
Coefficient
  (303.555)   (350.287)
 (0.00941)  (0.01068)
Part 3
Variable  2000-2001  2001-2002
Intercept   5477.803   6398.556
Equalized Assessed Valuation  -0.00042  -0.00035
per pupil  (0.00015)  (0.00013)
Median Family Income   0.04658    0.03446
R   0.172    0.100 
2
Correlation   0.415   0.316
Coefficient
  (278.514)   (339.070)
 (0.00848)  (0.01013)Lessons from Vermont page 36
Table 4A
Relationships Between Expenditures and Wealth Measures for Vermont K-12 Districts
Dependent Variable: Current Expenditures Per Equalized Pupil
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Part 1
Variable   1997-98  2000-2001
Intercept  5551.390  7671.651
Equalized Assessed Valuation   0.00208   0.00179
per pupil in 1998  (0.00065)  (0.00091)
R   0.200   0.120
2
Correlation   0.447   0.346
coefficient
 (240.642)  (314.633)
Part 2
Variable   1997-98  2000-2001
Intercept  4539.397  6690.965
Adjusted Gross Income per   0.11919   0.11254
Exemption in 1995  (0.05448)  (0.04636)
R   0.155   0.109
2
Correlation   0.394   0.330
coefficient
 (779.732)  (733.089)
Part 3
Variable  1997-98  2000-2001
Intercept   5131.453   7113.170
Equalized Assessed Valuation   0.00153   0.00109
per pupil in 1998  (0.00091)  (0.00130)
Adjusted Gross Income per   0.04390    0.05893
Exemption in 1995  (0.08008)  (0.08234)
R   0.219    0.135 
2
Correlation   0.468   0.367
Coefficient
  (933.787)  (933.681)Lessons from Vermont page 37
Table 4B
Relationships Between Expenditures and Wealth Measures for Vermont K-12 Districts
Dependent Variable: Total Expenditures Per Equalized Pupil
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Part 1
Variable  1997-1998  2000-2001
Intercept   6807.647  8886.544
Equalized Assessed Valuation   0.00161   0.00133
per pupil in 1998  (0.00101)  (0.00110)
R   0.034   0.030
2
Correlation   0.184   0.173
Coefficient
  (478.282)  (444.865)
Part 2
Variable  1997-1998  2000-2001
Intercept   5464.105  7602.565
Adjusted Gross Income per   0.12711   0.11493
Exemption in 1995  (0.10495)  (0.05254)
R   0.048   0.049
2
Correlation   0.219   0.221
Coefficient
 (1577.796)  (840.889)
Part 3
Variable  1997-1998  2000-2001
Intercept   5455.199   7702.238
Equalized Assessed Valuation  -0.00007   0.00078
per pupil in 1998  (0.00097)  (0.00125)
Adjusted Gross Income per   0.12948    0.08834
Exemption in 1995  (0.11663)  (0.05751)
R   0.048    0.059 
2
Correlation   0.219   0.243
Coefficient
 (1614.335)   (857.560)Lessons from Vermont page 38
Table 5A
Relationships Between Expenditures and Wealth Measures for Vermont Elementary Districts
Located in Towns That Do Not Tuition-Out High School Students 
Dependent Variable: Current Expenditures Per Equalized Pupil
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Part 1
Variable   1997-98  2000-2001
Intercept  5489.755  7333.604
Equalized Assessed Valuation   0.00098   0.00145
per pupil in 1998  (0.00024)  (0.00042)
R   0.170   0.155
2
Correlation   0.412   0.394
coefficient
 (175.307)  (256.968)
Part 2
Variable   1997-98  2000-2001
Intercept  5116.117  7112.060
Adjusted Gross Income per   0.07212   0.08422
Exemption in 1995  (0.03679)  (0.05340)
R   0.032   0.018
2
Correlation   0.179   0.134
coefficient
 (505.333)  (733.717)
Part 3
Variable  1997-98  2000-2001
Intercept  5187.736  7224.689
Equalized Assessed Valuation   0.00088   0.00138
per pupil in 1998  (0.00024)  (0.00046)
Adjusted Gross Income per   0.02655    0.01255
Exemption in 1995  (0.03745)  (0.05353)
R   0.161    0.147 
2
Correlation   0.401   0.383
Coefficient
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Table 5B
Relationships Between Expenditures and Wealth Measures for Vermont Elementary Districts
Located in Towns That Do Not Tuition-Out High School Students
Dependent Variable: Total Expenditures Per Equalized Pupil
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Part 1
Variable  1997-1998  2000-2001
Intercept   6430.578   8294.678
Equalized Assessed Valuation   0.00099   0.00156
per pupil in 1998  (0.00023)  (0.00047)
R   0.068   0.098
2
Correlation   0.261   0.313
Coefficient
  (231.805)   (318.056)
Part 2
Variable  1997-1998  2000-2001
Intercept  5635.405  7461.996
Adjusted Gross Income per   0.10323   0.13541
Exemption in 1995  (0.05418)  (0.07123)
R   0.024   0.025
2
Correlation   0.155   0.158
Coefficient
 (764.984)  (991.284)
Part 3
Variable  1997-1998  2000-2001
Intercept   5707.972   7578.357
Equalized Assessed Valuation   0.00089   0.00143
per pupil in 1998  (0.00026)  (0.00052)
Adjusted Gross Income per   0.05705    0.06137
Exemption in 1995  (0.05507)  (0.07464)
R   0.073    0.099
2
Correlation   0.270   0.315
Coefficient
 (735.322)   (939.968)Lessons from Vermont page 40
Table 6
GLM Estimates of Impact of Act 60 on Student Performance - Fixed Effects Estimates
1
Dependent Variable: Number of Test-Takers at or above Standard in Mathematical Concepts
(Asymptotic Standard Errors Robust to Heteroskedasticity and Within Group Correlation in Parentheses)
Variable Fourth Graders Eighth Graders
Variable Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2
Dummy Variable Indicating -11.0842 -11.4873 -1.1104 -0.7087
Post-Act 60 (1.2278) (1.2377) (1.1417) (1.1157)
Interaction of Post-Act 60 ----- 0.0000001 ----- -0.0000013
Dummy with Per Pupil (0.0000010) (0.0000007)
Equalized Assessed Valuation -
1998
Interaction of Post-Act 60 -0.00004 ----- -0.00004 -----
Dummy and Current Expend. (0.00001)           (0.00002)
Per Pupil - 1995
Poverty Rate 0.0166 0.0204 0.0232 0.0305
(0.0153) (0.0157) (0.0193) (0.0199)
Adjusted Gross Income per -0.00007 -0.00007 0.00005 0.00003
Exemption (0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00004)
Dummy Variable Indicating -12.6610 -12.7888 -1.2845 -0.7463
1995-96 School Year (1.1588) (1.1904) (1.0080) (0.9941)
Dummy Variable Indicating -11.6967 -11.8655 -1.0568 -0.5050
1997-98 School Year (1.1880) (1.2138) (1.0929) (1.0742)
Dummy Variable Indicating 0.0289 0.0132 -0.0443 -0.0309
1999-2000 School Year (0.0615) (0.0651) (0.0601) (0.0584)
Dummy Variable Indicating 0.3159 0.3062 0.1145 0.1751
2000-2001 School Year (0.1005) (0.1073) (0.1002) (0.1035)
Log of Likelihood Function -2474.6375 -2522.3365 -1541.9252 -1591.7884
Number of Observations 966 974 566 579
Note: 1) The constant is omitted from each specification.  The omitted school year is 1998-1999.WORKING PAPER SERIES 2003
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